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NO PLACE TO CALL HOME
STATELESS VIETNAMESE ASYLUM-SEEKERS IN
HONG KONG
RACHEL SETFLAGE*
I. INTRODUCTION
There is no greater sorrow on earth than the loss of one's native land.
- Euripides, 431 B.C.'
The stateless person has been... compared to a vessel on the open sea
not sailing under the flag of any state, or to a bird which flies alone.
- A. Peter Mutharika 2
The right to nationality is recognized globally under international law.
However, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (the "UN-
HCR") has estimated that hundreds of thousands of people worldwide may
be stateless.3 A small group of ethnic-Chinese migrants from Vietnam
currently residing in Hong Kong is part of that number. These migrants have
been universally rejected by all countries that could or should claim responsi-
bility for them, and they currently exist in a state of limbo in Hong Kong, as
yet unacknowledged stateless persons.
This note will address why these individuals are stateless and what the
implications are for them under current international law. Prior to the
handover of Hong Kong to Chinese control, Britain had certain obligations
under international law to these people by virtue of their statelessness. Today,
Vietnam and the international community have certain obligations to these
people. These obligations will be analyzed under basic human rights law, the
international law of statelessness, and international customary law. Finally, it
will be suggested that these individuals should be considered refugees and, as
such, are protected under the auspices of the UNHCR.
* B.A. University of California Berkeley 1992, J.D., M.S. Candidate, Georgetown University Law
Centers May 1998. 1 would like to thank Professor Viet D. Dinh for his invaluable assistance and support
in developing this paper.
1. Cited in UNHCR Public Information Section, UNHCR and Refugees, (visited February 20, 1997)
<http://www.unhcr.ch>.
2. A. PETER MUTHARtKA, THE REGULATION OF STATELESSNESS UNDER INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL
LAW 1 (1989).
3. See UNHCI Public Information Section, UNHCR and Refugees [February 20, 1997] http://
www.unhcr.ch/un&ref/who/whois.htm# 2040.
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II. BACKGROUND
In the last twenty years, over 200,000 Vietnamese have escaped to Hong
Kong seeking asylum.4 This process began in the aftermath of the fall of
Saigon in 1975, when 3,743 Vietnamese asylum-seekers were rescued from
the South China Sea and arrived in Hong Kong aboard the Danish ship, the
Clara Maersk.5 Hong Kong agreed to grant these asylum-seekers first asylum
pending their resettlement elsewhere in the world. Britain confirmed this
policy in 1979 during the International Convention on Indo-Chinese Refu-
gees, where it was agreed that Vietnamese asylum-seekers would be exempt
from normal refugee screening procedures.6 In addition, other countries
pledged that they would match the rate of arrivals of asylum seekers in Hong
Kong through a worldwide resettlement program. 7 The Vietnamese govern-
ment agreed to try to deter mass emigration, and to aid those efforts, Hong
Kong implemented a policy whereby all asylum-seekers arriving from
Vietnam were detained in closed camps pending resettlement.8
By 1988, however, it was clear that Hong Kong's plan was not working.
Due to what one Hong Kong judge has termed "compassion fatigue," the
international community had become less willing to accept Vietnamese
refugees for resettlement. 9 Yet, the number of asylum-seekers fleeing from
Vietnam continued to increase. As a result, a massive backlog of immigrants
developed in Hong Kong's detention centers, pending resettlement that
seemed highly unlikely.a°
After consultation with the UNHCR, Hong Kong decided to cease being a
country of first asylum, to begin a screening policy for Vietnamese immi-
grants, and to repatriate those Vietnamese not screened in as refugees. The
UN and the international community formalized this policy in 1989, and it
became the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indo-Chinese Refugees (the
"CPA"). Under the CPA, all Vietnamese migrants were classified as illegal
immigrants and detained pending a determination of refugee status. Determi-
nation of refugee status was adjudicated according to the guidelines of the
UNHCR, the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees and the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees. 12 Under the UN Convention on Refugees,
4. See Simon Buerk, Boat People on History's Ebb 7de, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 17, 1997, at 9.
These people came to be known globally as boat people, due to the small rickety boats in which they
would travel to reach foreign lands, braving sharks, pirates, starvation, and drowning. See UNHCR, Hong
Kong, (visited February 20, 1997) <http:// www.unhcr.ch/world/asia/hongkong.htm>.
5. See LEONARD DAVIS, HONG KONG AND THE ASYLUM SEEKERS FROM VIETNAM 1 (1991).
6. InRe Chung Tu Quan & Ors., I HKC 566 (1995) AT 11.
7. See Davis, supra note 5, at 7.
8. See id.
9. See Tan Le Lam v. Superintendent of Tai A Chau Detention Center, 4 ALL ER 256, 2 WLR 963
Hong Kong(P.C. 1996).
10. In Re Chung Tu Quan, supra note 6, at 12.
11. See DAVIS, supra note 5, at 17.
12. See Hong Kong: Immigration, Topical Information A to Z (visited March 18, 1997) <http://
www.info.gov.hk /info/fimmigrahtm>.
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a refugee is a person who, "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable to or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection
of that country." ' 3 Detainees classified as refugees then awaited resettlement
to other countries. 4
Since 1979, over 143,000 Vietnamese refugees have been resettled over-
seas through the CPA process. Approximately 1,300 additional refugees
await resettlement.1 5 The government screened out the remaining 68,300
asylum-seekers as non-refugees, on the basis that they were not facing a
well-founded fear of persecution but were instead fleeing economic condi-
tions.16 The Vietnamese asylum-seekers were repatriated to Vietnam or
placed in closed detention camps pending repatriation.17 Over 66,500 Viet-
namese have been repatriated to Vietnam under the CPA. 18
Approximately 1,800 Vietnamese non-refugee asylum seekers remain in
Hong Kong.' 9 Most are awaiting repatriation. Some, however, cannot be
repatriated because Vietnam considers them to be non-nationals and refuses
to accept them. This group of people is the focus of this paper. They are
Vietnamese asylum-seekers who are stateless, and as such, face a highly
precarious position now that the handover of Hong Kong from British to
Chinese control is complete.
A. Stateless Persons in Hong Kong
A stateless person is a person who does not have a nationality under the
law of any state. There are two types of statelessness: de jure and defacto. De
jure statelessness may be either original or subsequent. Original statelessness
results when a person does not acquire a nationality under the law of any state
13. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted July 28, 1951, cited in United Nations
Treaty Series, Vol.189, No.2545, (1954).
14. See Tang Lay Lee, Some Gaps in the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indo-Chinese Refugees,
MIGRATION WORLD MAG., Jan.- Apr. 1995.
15. See Buerk, supra note 4; see also Emma Batha, 'Stateless' Family Eyes New Home Overseas, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, June 1, 1997. The CPA ended in July 1996; however special arrangements have
been made to continue resettling the remaining refugees in Hong Kong; see Britain and Hong Kong 1997:
Countdown to Handover, (visited March 18, 1997) <http://www.fco.gov.uk/hongkong/brief. html#imm>.
16. See Gary Silverman, No Exit: Forced Repatriation Looms for Last Boat People, FAR EASTERN
EcONOMIc REVIEW, p. 18 (November 3, 1994).
17. Non-refugee Vietnamese are repatriated to Vietnam under two schemes. The first scheme is
known as the Voluntary Repatriation Scheme and is administered by the UNHCR. A Vietnamese who
agrees to voluntary repatriation is given financial and administrative assistance by the UNHCR and
returned to Vietnam as quickly as possible. Approximately 57,500 Vietnamese from Hong Kong have
been repatriated in this manner. The second scheme is known as Orderly Repatriation and is administered
by the Hong Kong government. Orderly repatriation is compulsory, and more than 9,000 migrants have
been repatriated under this scheme; see Buerk, supra note 4; See also UNHCR: Hong Kong, supra note 4.
18. See Buerk, supra note 4.
19. See UNHCR: Hong Kong, supra note 4.
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at birth.20 Subsequent statelessness occurs when a person becomes stateless
later in life by losing her nationality without acquiring another.2 ' In 1949, the
UN expanded the definition of statelessness to include de facto stateless
persons, or those who, "having left the country of which they were nationals,
no longer enjoy the protection and assistance of their national authorities,
either because these authorities refuse to grant them assistance and protec-
tion, or because they themselves renounce the assistance and protection of
the countries of which they are nationals. ' '2 2 In 1995, the Executive Commit-
tee of the UNHCR reaffirmed this two-prong definition of statelessness:
[Statelessness] ... includes de jure stateless, which according to the
1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons refers to 'a
person who is not considered as a national by any State under the
operation of its laws; also includes de facto stateless which refers to
those persons with an ineffective nationality or those who cannot
establish their nationality.
23
The stateless asylum-seekers in Hong Kong form two groups. The first
group consists of approximately 250 ethnic-Chinese who claim Taiwanese
nationality.24 They have been screened out as refugees-a decision rein-
forced in a 1994 Hong Kong Court of Appeals case-25-but cannot be
repatriated because Vietnam considers them to be non-nationals.2 6 The
second group consists of approximately 300 ethnic Chinese who originally
fled or were expelled from Vietnam to China and who eventually found their
way to Hong Kong.2 7 This group was just recently granted refugee status, but
is fighting forced resettlement to China.28
The history of the first group began in 1929, when the Nationality Law of
the Republic of China granted all ethnic-Chinese living in Vietnam Republic
20. P. WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 161 (1979). This would
include, for instance, "children of parents of mixed origin or who are born in a country other than their
parents' country of origin, since they do not necessarily gain citizenship of the place where they are born"
See UNHCR & Refugees, supra note 3.
21. Id. at 162. In some countries, for instance, this can occur as a result of a prolonged sojourn abroad,
deprivation of nationality as a penalty, or due to territorial changes such as occurred in Bosnia. See
UNHCR & Refugees, Supra note 3.
22. A STuDY ON STATELESSNESS, United Nations Publication 8-9 (1949).
23. EXCOM Conclusions No.78 (1995) (visited November 22, 1997) <http. unhcr.ch/refworld/index/
stateless/stateless.htm>.
24. In actuality, they claim the nationality of the Republic of China (ROC), which is now commonly
known as Taiwan. The number of migrants claiming ROC nationality may actually be significantly larger.
There is evidence that more and more detainees are claiming ROC nationality, but it is unclear whether
these later claims are genuine or attempts to avoid detention and repatriation. Director of Immigration &
Anor. v Le Tu Phuong & Anor., 1 HKC 263 (1994).
25. Director of Inmigration, supra note 25.
26. Patricia Young, Refugees Face Forced-Labor Farms, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 12, 1997.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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of China (ROC) nationality and identity papers.2 9 In 1948, after China
overthrew the ROC and the ROC moved to Taiwan, thousands of ethnic-
Chinese attempted to move to Taiwan. Most were stopped by the Vietnamese
government. 30 After the communist victory in Vietnam in 1975, these
individuals again asserted their ROC nationality when registering for elec-
tions, and in response, the Vietnamese government issued them resident alien
papers. 3 ' Those individuals who then fled to Hong Kong after the 1979
Chinese-Vietnamese war are now considered by Vietnam to be non-nationals
on the basis of their Taiwanese identity papers or resident alien papers.32
Vietnam is refusing to allow them to be repatriated.33
It would seem that the next logical step would be to repatriate these
individuals to Taiwan. However, Taiwan also refuses them. Under the 1973
Domicile Act of the ROC, passports issued to ROC nationals overseas
require visas for entry to and residence in Taiwan. 4 Many of the detainees in
Hong Kong do not have passports, having either Vietnamese resident alien
papers or their parents' ROC passports3 5 These papers are not sufficient for
gaining entry into Taiwan. Furthermore, even for those with ROC passports,
very few nationals residing overseas are permitted to permanently reside in
Taiwan under the Entry, Temporary and Permanent Residence of Nationals
and the Household Registration Procedures Regulations.
3 6
These individuals are defacto stateless persons under UN guidelines, and
as such are entitled to protection as stateless persons. They no longer enjoy
the protection and assistance of a national authority, whether it is Vietnam or
Taiwan.
The second group of stateless asylum-seekers, those who originally fled or
were expelled from Vietnam to China, are controversially termed ECVHs or
Ex-China Vietnamese Illegal Immigrants.3 7 After the 1979 Chinese-
Vietnamese war, Vietnam expelled thousands of ethnic-Chinese, many of
whom still live in southwestern China. 8 However, none have Chinese
identity papers. They are considered by Chinese officials to be "Indo-
Chinese refugees," and China would prefer that they return to Vietnam.39
Many of these ethnic-Chinese eventually migrated to Hong Kong. How-
ever, until November 1996, Hong Kong law provided that any migrant found
to have settled in China before coming to Hong Kong was an illegal
29. Director of Immigration, supra note 24.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Staying On?, THE ECONOMIST, 36, 37 (Jan. 11, 1997).
33. Tan Le Lam, supra note 9.
34. Lee, supra note 14.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Re Chung Tu Quan, supra note 6, at 33.
38. See Staying On? supra note 32.
39. Id.
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immigrant from China and would be repatriated to China. At that time, a
Privy Council hearing ruled that ECVIIs were entitled to a screening
procedure.4° In June 1997, the remaining ECVIIs in Hong Kong were
screened in as refugees, but the government ruled that they had to be returned
to mainland China.4' China, on the other hand, remains unwilling to accept
many of these migrants because they are "Indo-Chinese refugees" or ROC
nationals. 42 The ECVIIs themselves are waging a legal battle not to be
returned to China on the grounds that the Chinese government has mistreated
them and will continue to do SO.
4 3
As with the ethnic Taiwanese of the first group, the ECVIIs fit the
definition of de facto stateless persons established by the UN because no
governmental authority is willing to accept them as nationals and to welcome
them home. Although they have been screened in as refugees, they are being
told to return to the Chinese mainland where they are not wanted and will not
be treated well.
B. ' Significance of Statelessness
Statelessness is a highly undesirable position. Nationality is an essential
link between an individual, the state, and international law. This link grants
the protection of the State, both at home and abroad, and allows a State to
intervene on behalf of an individual under international law. According to
one international law hombook, "the rules of international law relating to
diplomatic protection are based on the view that nationality is the essential
condition for securing to the individual the protection of his rights in the
international sphere." 44
Being stateless is particularly problematic for the ethnic-Chinese and
Taiwanese stateless asylum-seekers. Those screened in as refugees have still
not been offered the protection of a state that wishes to assimilate them.
Those screened out have no hope of being resettled abroad and no hope of
returning to Vietnam, China or Taiwan. Thus, all exist in a state of limbo. In a
recent court case, Hong Kong finally acknowledged that these individuals
had no hope of returning to Vietnam or China, and released them from many
years of detention.45
The future of all of these stateless asylum-seekers is still undetermined.
Before the handover of Hong Kong to China, they enjoyed a certain amount
of protection since Hong Kong, by virtue of having been a British Territory,
40. Nguyen Tuan Cuong v. Dir. of Immigration, 1 WLR 68 (Hong Kong P.C. 1996).
41. Young, supra note 26.
42. Staying On?, supra note 32; Lee, supra note 14.
43. Young, supra note 26.; Neil Western, "Judge Offers Refugees Some Hope," WORLD SOURCES
ONLINE, INC., Sept. 16, 1997.
44. L.V. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW; VOL. 1669 (1955), cited in WEIS, supra note 20, at 162.
45. See Tan Le Lam, supra note 9.
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was party to both the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons,
and the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.
China is party to neither Convention and made it very clear that it did not
want any asylum-seekers in Hong Kong once it gained control.4 6 In light of
China's weak human rights record, the future these people face is tenuous at
best if they are not granted the nationality and accordant protection of a state.
III. BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Any analysis of international law on statelessness must begin with, and
build upon, basic principles of human rights law. The Universal Declaration
on Human Rights (the "Universal Declaration"), adopted by the UN General
Assembly on December 10, 1948, is the cornerstone of human rights law. 
7
The two other cornerstone documents are the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (the "ICCPR") and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (the "ICESCR"). 48
Although it is not a binding covenant under international law, the Univer-
sal Declaration was adopted almost unanimously by the UN General Assem-
bly and is recognized by the international community. The Universal Decla-
ration sets forth the basic universal standards regarding individual human
rights. The primary right is the right to a nationality. The Universal Declara-
tion states, in Article 15, that "[e]veryone has the right to a nationality," and
that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality.",49 Under the
Universal Declaration therefore, signatory states are constrained from the
arbitrary denial of a citizen's nationality. But the Universal Declaration does
not protect the stateless asylum-seekers.
Vietnam arguably has violated the constraint against arbitrary denial of a
citizen's nationality by arbitrarily claiming that the stateless asylum-seekers
are non-nationals. According to China and Taiwan, Vietnam is therefore
responsible for the stateless asylum-seekers' status. Vietnam counters that
any such stateless status stems from the Chinese and Taiwanese govern-
ments' refusal to recognize their nationality. In short, the Chinese, Taiwanese,
and Vietnamese governments each eschew the constraint against arbitrary
denial of nationality by claiming that the duty rests with the others.
Even Article 13 of the Declaration which states that "[e]veryone has the
right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country" 50
is not helpful. The stateless asylum-seekers have availed themselves of the
right to leave a country. However, the subsequent right of return is only to the
46. See Silverman, supra note 16, p. 19
47. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, U.N.G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc.
A/810 (1948).
48. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6
I.L.M. 368 (1967) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
49. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 47, art. 15 (1) and (2).
50. Id., at art. 13 (2).
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country of one's nationality. Since the stateless asylum-seekers do not have a
nationality, they are not entitled to the rights specified in Article 13.
Finally, while the Universal Declaration confers a right of nationality on an
individual, it does not confer a complementary duty upon states to grant
nationality. Thus, neither Vietnam nor China nor Taiwan has an obligation
under the Universal Declaration to grant the stateless asylum-seekers a
nationality. Likewise, countries to which the stateless asylum-seekers could
resettle have no obligation to grant them nationality under the Declaration.
The two additional human rights documents underlying international
human rights law are the ICCPR and the ICESCR. These documents
comprehensively enumerate the specific rights of individuals and duties of
States with respect to human rights.51 Vietnam and Hong Kong are parties to
both Covenants. China is party to neither Covenant.52 Even if China was a
party, neither Covenant is particularly helpful in this case. The ICESCR has
no provisions regarding nationality or statelessness and the ICCPR only
restates the provision regarding nationality found in the Universal Declara-
tion. 3
Because the Universal Declaration, the ICCPR and the ICESCR do not
provide the necessary tools with which the stateless asylum-seekers could
obtain a nationality, one must look beyond basic human rights law for a
solution to their statelessness.
. IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING STATELESSNESS
In 1949, the UN International Law Commission included statelessness in
its list of topics selected for codification.54 As a result, the Ad Hoc Committee
of the Economic and Social Council, which drafted the Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees, drew up a Protocol Relating to the Status of
Stateless Persons. A Conference of Plenipotentiaries assembled to address
the Protocol and decided the instrument should be in the form of a Conven-
tion. On September 28, 1954, the Convention Relating to the Status of
Stateless Persons was adopted and opened for signature. 55 Forty-two (42)
States have joined to date.56 This convention is particularly important, for it
51. ICCPR, supra note 48; ICESCR, supra note 48.
52. The Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (BORO) gives effect to the ICCPR in domestic law, and
the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law provide that the provisions of the ICCPR and ICESCR, as applied
to Hong Kong, will remain in force after 1997. Britain and Hong Kong 1997: Countdown to Handover,
supra note 15.
53. Article 12 of the ICCPR in part (2) states that "[e]veryone shall be free to leave any country,
including his own," and in part (4) that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own
country." Article 24 (3) states that "[e]very child has the right to acquire a nationality." ICCPR, supra note
48.
54. WEIs, supra note 20, at 165.
55. Id. at 168-69.
56. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 360 U.N.T.S. 117,entered into force June
6, 1960. The following States are signatories of the Convention: Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina,
Armenia, Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, the former Macedonia, the
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lays out both the rights of a stateless person and the obligations of a signatory
State toward a stateless person.
The ratification process for the Convention relating to the Status of
Stateless Persons began during the UN's Fourth Session. During the Fifth
Session, the International Law Commission of the UN adopted two separate
draft conventions on the Elimination of Statelessness and the Reduction of
Future Statelessness, which were then presented to the General Assembly for
consideration.57 The committee eventually combined these two drafts into
one convention, the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, adopted at
a special conference in New York on August 28, 1961, and entered into force
on December 13, 1975.58 Currently, only seventeen (17) States have ratified
the Convention.59 While this Convention looks specifically at ways to
prevent future statelessness, it also reiterates and strengthens the provisions
of the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.
Both the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, and the
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness require that state parties fulfill
certain affirmative obligations towards stateless persons. For instance, Article
8 of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness provides that "a
contracting State shall not deprive a person of its nationality if such
deprivation would render him stateless.", 60 Under Article 9, a contracting
State "may not deprive any person or group of persons of [ ...] nationality on
racial, ethnic, religious or political grounds." 61 Even if one could assign
responsibility to Vietnam, China, or Taiwan for the stateless asylum-seeker's
lack of nationality, since these States have not signed onto the Conventions,
they were not obligated by the terms of these Conventions to refrain from
depriving the statelessasylum-seekers of their nationality.
The rights of stateless persons in a country of asylum are promising under
the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. A host country
must treat a stateless person on a level equal to that of its other resident
aliens. With respect to rights which include freedom of religion, public
education, public relief, and social security, the host country must treat the
stateless person in the same manner as its nationals.62 Rights acquired by a
stateless person prior to being stateless, particularly the right to marriage,
Republic of Yugoslav, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Holy See, Honduras, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Kiribati, Republic of Korea, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg,
Madagascar, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago,
Tunisia, Uganda, United Kingdom, Yugoslavia, and Zambia.
57. WEis, supra note 20, at 165.
58. Jd. at 166.
59. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 989 U.N.T.S. 175, entered into force Dec. 13, 1975.
The following states have ratified the Convention: Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Canada, Costa
Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Kiribati, Latvia, Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
60. Id. at art. (8).
61. Id. at art. (9).
62. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, supra note 56, at art. (4), (7), (13), (14),
(15), (17), (18), (19), (20), (21), (22), (23), (24).
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must be maintained.63 All stateless persons are entitled to free access to the
courts of law of contracting States. 64 Contracting States cannot expel a
stateless person lawfully in their territory, "save on grounds of national
security or public order."
65
As Britain is a contracting State, when Hong Kong was still a British
territory the stateless asylum-seekers were treated, for the most part, in
accordance with the guidelines outlined above. For example, in Tan Te Lam
& Others v. Superintendent of Tai A Chau Detention Center, the Hong Kong
Privy Council held that it was unreasonable to hold those whom Vietnam
considered non-nationals in detention pending repatriation.66 The Council
released almost three hundred and fifty people from the detention centers.67
They were permitted to move around freely and work in the city, and to live
in the city or in half-way houses.68 While the Privy Council did not
specifically recognize these individuals as stateless, they were treated on a
level equal to other legal aliens in Hong Kong.
Moreover, the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons binds
contracting parties to facilitate, to the fullest extent possible, the assimilation
and naturalization of stateless persons. Britain failed to honor this obligation
when Hong Kong was still its territory. The British government relied on the
fact that neither Convention had been incorporated into British municipal law
and, thus, was not legally binding on Britain. 69 This argument is disingenu-
ous because, while not formally bound under international law, Britain was
obligated by other factors to uphold the provisions of the Conventions and
because principles of justice demanded such an outcome.
First, Britain failed to acknowledge that, by signing onto the Conventions,
it was agreeing to their contractual obligations and signaling its willingness
to abide by their provisions and incorporate them into domestic law. Second,
Britain gave insufficient recognition to the diplomatic weight of the interna-
tional community, which could have validly reproached Britain for its failure
63. Id. at art. (12).
64. Id. at art. (16).
65. Id. at art. (31).
66. Tan Le Lam., supra note 9.
67. Billy Wong Wai Yuk & Scott McKenzie, First Day Out of Camps Leaves Boat People Suddenly
Confused, Freed Viets to Seek Asylum in Third Countries, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 14, 1996; Hong
Kong Releases 130 Vietnamese Migrants, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 18, 1996.
68. Hong Kong Releases 130 Vietnamese Migrants, supra note 67.
69. Under fundamental British law, all treaties and conventions are non-self executing, and therefore
require legislative implementation before they can be enforced. This has not yet happened in Britain. In R
v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex parte Anilkumar Ravindrabhai Patel, the Queen's Bench stated that the
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons was not part of British municipal law. 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 695, 697-698 (1995). In Yin Xiang Jiang Simon v Director of Immigration, the Hong Kong Court
of Appeal held that while persuasive, the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons had not
been incorporated into Hong Kong municipal law and was, therefore, not binding. 1 HKC 348 (1994). The
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, likewise, has not been incorporated into Hong Kong or
British municipal law. Thus, despite the fact that Britain is a signatory to both Conventions, it is not legally
bound by the provisions of the Conventions. Carlos Manuel Vasquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-
Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695, 697-98 (1995).
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to facilitate the naturalization of the stateless asylum seekers.7 ° Possibly
because of the small number of people at issue, the relative lack of exposure
of the problem, or a general reluctance to infringe upon State sovereignty, the
international community did little to exert pressure on Britain to do so. The
fact remains that Britain had valid obligations to facilitate the naturalization
of the stateless asylum-seekers but failed to do so. Nonetheless, since Britain
is no longer an actor in this situation, and since neither China, Vietnam nor
Taiwan have signed on to either Convention on Statelessness, neither
Convention offers a solution for the stateless asylum-seekers.
IV. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Like the basic principles of human rights law, and the international law
regarding statelessness, customary international law does not provide a
solution for the stateless asylum-seekers. The first problem lies in determin-
ing just what comprises customary international law. International jurispru-
dence outlines two conditions necessary for proving the existence of a
customary rule of international law. The first condition is evidence of a
sufficient degree of state practice.7 ' The second is a determination that states
see themselves as acting under a legal obligation.7 2 Under these conditions, it
is almost impossible to find that international customary law exists regarding
statelessness.
First, there is no clear international custom or protocol for the prevention
of statelessness. An ongoing report by the UNHCR suggests that hundreds of
thousands of people worldwide may be stateless, including citizens of the
former East Bloc, Bidoons in Kuwait, Gypsies throughout Central Europe,
Kurds and Palestinians.7 3 Thus, many States make no consistent effort to
prevent statelessness. Clearly, the governments of Vietnam, China and
Taiwan do not think themselves bound by any such legal obligation.
Determining to what degree States practice the protection and naturaliza-
tion of stateless persons is also difficult. On the one hand, there are several
instances where stateless persons have been recognized and protected as
such. Following World War I and World War II, persons rendered stateless as
a result of the wars were, for the most part, embraced by the international
70. The international community did castigate Britain for refusing to grant full British citizenship to
Hong Kong ethnic minorities holding only British Nationals Overseas (BNO) passports. International
watchdogs such as the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative warned that Britain's intransigence would
render thousands of people stateless at the Handover in violation of international law. In February 1997,
largely as a result of this pressure, Britain did grant BNO passport holders in Hong Kong full citizenship
rights. David Wallen, Illegal Status Warning; Ethnic Minorities Plight to be Highlighted at Summit, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 18, 1995; Jonathan, Braude. Hopefids for 78 Countries Seek Papers; More
than 8,000 People Eligible at Time of Handover, Immigration Department Projections Show, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Feb. 5, 1997.
71. Bayefsky, Anne F., General Approaches to Domestic Application of International Law, in HUMAN
RIGHTS OF WOMEN 360 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994).
72. Id.
73. UNHCR and Refugees, supra note 3.
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community and quickly absorbed as nationals into the countries in which
they sought asylum. 74 Likewise, in July of 1994, the Lebanese government
granted nationality to some 130,000 stateless persons within its territory.
75
However, statelessness today is a tremendous problem, one which few
countries are addressing.76 The lack of success on the part of the international
community to address statelessness indicates that a valid and binding
Customary International Law on statelessness does not exist. In fact, several
international and national bodies who have attempted to identify customary
international norms in the human rights field have conspicuously left out any
norms regarding statelessness." The solution to the stateless asylum-seekers'
dilemma, therefore, must come from other avenues.
V. THE POTENTIAL REFUGEE STATUS AND RESETTLEMENT OF THE
STATELESS VIETNAMESE
The stateless asylum-seekers who fled to Hong Kong via China were just
recently granted refugee status, while those who fled directly from Vietnam
are still considered non-refugees. Granting all of the stateless asylum-seekers
refugee status is the first vital step to finding a solution because once refugee
status is granted, a suitable resettlement country can and must be found. The
organization that has the capability to undertake both of these tasks is the
United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR).
A. Refugee Status
The definition of a refugee as accepted under CIL is defined in the 1951
Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Article 1 A (2) of
the Convention states that the term refugee shall apply to any person who:
"... owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable
or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside of the
74. For example, following World War 1, former citizens of Austria-Hungary, Italy, Poland, Yugosla-
via, Czechoslovak Republics and the USSR were generally granted nationality of the country in which
they resided or wished to reside. Likewise, Russian Jews deprived of nationality in 1921, were given back
their citizenship following World War II. A STUDY ON STATELESsNaSs, supra note 22.
75. E-mail from Peter Barnes, Esq. Pam Baker and Company, (Dec. 20, 1996).
76. For example, neither the European Court of Justice nor the International Court of Justice have
addressed the issue of statelessness at all, and the EC Treaty had no provisions for stateless persons within
the EC.
77. The customary international human rights norms that have been identified include freedom from
torture, disappearance, arbitrary detention and genocide, the right not to be murdered or enslaved, and
freedom from loss of consortium and racial discrimination. Yet even these norms are highly controversial.
Bayefsky, supra note 72, at 361.
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country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is
unable or, is unwilling to return to it.
78
The stateless asylum-seekers who have not yet been granted refugee status fit
the definition of refugees in two different ways. First of all, a refugee is
someone who faces a well-founded fear of persecution in their home country.
According to UNHCR guidelines there is both a subjective and objective
element to this requirement.
79
The subjective element is whether the asylum-seeker fears persecution,
and should be based only on the asylum-seeker's statements.8° Many of the
stateless asylum-seekers have indicated that they fear persecution in Viet-
nam."' Therefore, they meet the requirement of the subjective element.
The objective element is whether the asylum-seeker's fear is well-
founded.82 This determination is based upon an evaluation of the particular
circumstances of the asylum-seeker's situation. 83 In particular, the basis of
the asylum-seeker's fear must be evaluated.
In this case, the asylum-seekers fear persecution in Vietnam on the basis of
their race. They are ethnically Chinese, and there is a long history of tension
between the Chinese and the Vietnamese, a situation exacerbated by the 1979
Chinese-Vietnamese War. The fact that Vietnam refuses to recognize the
stateless asylum-seekers as Vietnamese nationals, and refuses to repatriate
them is a strong indication that they would face persecution based on
ethnicity if forced to return to Vietnam. Thus, their fear is well-founded.
The fact that these people are stateless because Vietnam refuses to
recognize their nationality also qualifies them as refugees. A refugee is also
defined as an individual "who, not having a nationality, and being outside the
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable
"to return to it."8 4 'Former habitual residence', is defined as "the country in
which [the asylum-seeker] had resided and where he had suffered or fears he
would suffer persecution if he is returned.", 85 Vietnam is clearly the former
habitual residence of these asylum-seekers, and as discussed above, they left
Vietnam because of a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of their
race. Furthermore, they are unable to return to Vietnam because of Vietnam's
intransigence. Therefore, according to the 1951 Convention and UNHCR
78. The definition of a refugee under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees only applied
to those who became refugees as a result of events occurring before January 1, 1951. The 1967 Protocol
revoked the calendar restriction. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 13; Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967).
79. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees-Handbook on Procedures and
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, 1992, Chapter II, Art. 38. [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
80. Id. at Chapter II, art. 40-41.
81. See Anor v. Le Tu Phuong, supra note 24 at 2.
82. HANDBOOK, supra note 79.
83. Id. at Chapter fl, Art. 42.
84. HANDBOOK, supra note 79, at Chapter II, art. 38.
85. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 13.
19971
GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL
guidelines, these asylum-seekers in Vietnam should have been granted
refugee status.
The stateless asylum-seekers who fled to Hong Kong via China were
found to have met the criteria for refugees by the Hong Kong government. It
makes no sense that their brethren were denied this status simply because
they came straight to Hong Kong without first stopping in China. Neverthe-
less, they were screened out as refugees under the CPA and Hong Kong
guidelines. Thus, they should look beyond the Hong Kong government to
have their cases reevaluated. The organization that can reevaluate their
situation and has the power to grant them refugee status is the UNHCR.
B. The UNHCR
In Hong Kong, the UNHCR has been instrumental in facilitating the CPA
and in promoting voluntary repatriation. Thus far, the role of the UNHCR
with respect to the stateless asylum-seekers has been to encourage these
individuals to return to Vietnam, or to mediate in discussions between
Vietnam, China and the UK.8 6 As indicated, these efforts have not been very
successful, and it is time for the UNHCR to take a more decisive role.
The UNHCR is in a unique position in that its mandate allows it to
recognize the refugee status of all of the stateless asylum-seekers in Vietnam.
Usually, there is no need for the UNHCR to engage in the determination of
refugee status, as this determination normally depends on one of the Refugee
Conventions and rests primarily with the contracting state. 87 In fact, the High
Commissioner has expressed a formal reluctance to assume the sole decision-
making responsibility. 88 Nevertheless, according to the Statute of the Office
of the UNHCR, the High Commissioner is called upon to provide interna-
tional protection to refugees falling under the auspices of her office.89
The definition of refugees falling under the High Commissioner's compe-
tence is substantially similar to the definition of a refugee under the 1951
Convention, and applicable no matter where the asylum-seeker is currently
residing. 90 In short, even if the asylum-seeker is in a country that is a party to
the 1951 Convention and has been screened out as a refugee, if that person
meets the criteria of the statute, she becomes a protectorate of the UNHCR as
a "mandate refugee." 9'
86. Staying on?, supra note 32; UNHCR: Hong Kong, supra note 4.
87. Note on the Determination of Refugee Status Under International Instruments, Executive
Committee on the High Commissioner's Programme, EC/SCP/5, Aug. 24, 1977. Indeed, in the case of the
ECVIIs, it was the Hong Kong authorities who determined their refugee status.
88. Follow-up On Earlier Conclusions of the Sub-Committee on the Determination of Refugee Status,
InterAlia, with Reference to the Role of the UNHCR in National Refugee Status Determination Procedure,
Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, EC/SCP/22/Rev. 1, Sept. 3 1982.
89. HANDBOOK, supra note 79, Introduction (E)(14).
90. Id. at Introduction (E)(15).
91. Id. at Introduction (E)(16).
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As demonstrated above, the stateless asylum-seekers qualify as refugees
under the 1951 Convention. While the criteria of the 1951 Convention are not
identical to criteria for refugee status under the Statute, they are so substan-
tively similar92 that all the stateless asylum-seekers should qualify as
refugees under the UNHCR Statute.
While the UNHCR may be reluctant to assume a decisive role in this
situation, such action would not be unprecedented. In September 1994, the
UNHCR exercised its mandate and granted refugee status to approximately
100 ethnic-Chinese Cambodians in Hong Kong.9 3 Rather than making
individual determinations, the UNHCR granted refugee status to the entire
group, which it determined to be facing persecution. The UNHCR has
recourse to such a method when it is clear that a particular group deserves
international protection.94
The stateless Vietnamese in Hong Kong clearly face persecution as a
group by virtue of being ethnically Chinese and thus, do fit the definition of
refugees under the UNHCR Statute. As such, they fall under the protection
and competence of the High Commissioner and like the ECVJIs, should be
granted refugee status.
Once granted refugee status, these individuals would have the opportunity
to be resettled elsewhere in the world. However, the UNHCR must also take
an active role in ensuring that these refugees are resettled in suitable third
countries. China, by virtue of the fact that it neither wants these individuals
nor has a history of treating these individuals well, is not a suitable
resettlement country. However, the United States, Britain, Sweden, and Japan
have already indicated a willingness to accept some refugees from Viet-
nam.95 Many of the stateless asylum-seekers have families in these countries,
as well as in Canada, Australia, and France.96 Resettlement in these countries
would be a highly desirable solution, but is not likely to occur unless all of
the stateless asylum-seekers are granted refugee status and the potential
resettlement countries face continued pressure to accept them.
VIII. CONCLUSION
No country is obligated under international law to accept responsibility for
the approximately 550 stateless asylum-seekers in Hong Kong. There are,
however, three potential courses of action that can be taken on behalf of these
individuals.
92. THE STATUTE OF THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, Annex to
Resolution 428 (V), adopted by the UN General Assembly on Dec. 14, 1950.
93. Lee, supra note 14.
94. Follow- Up On Earlier Conclusions of the Sub-Committee on the Determination of Refugee Status,
supra note 88 at art. (30).
95. Takayasu Ogura, UN Calls on Tokyo to Take Five More Boat People, MAINICfI DAILY NEWS, Aug.
5, 1997.
96. Stateless Vietnamese Refugees in Hong Kong Plead for Resettlement, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Sept. 15, 1997.
1997]
GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL
The first option is to seek cooperation from Vietnam. Already, Vietnam has
faced much pressure to repatriate the stateless asylum-seekers. Britain, in
particular, has exerted a great deal of pressure during a series of talks
between British and Vietnamese government officials.9 7 However, the latest
word from Vietnam's foreign minister was: "We cannot take them. It is
simply not in accordance with our laws.98 According to a UNHCR official,
Vietnam no longer wishes to discuss the issue of non-nationals and thus,
there is nothing left to negotiate. 99 Vietnam's intransigence may be a result of
the still lingering tensions between those of Chinese and Vietnamese descent.
Yet, whatever the reason, it does not seem likely that Vietnam will be the first
to back down in this situation.
The second possible solution is to convince China to grant citizenship to
all of the stateless asylum-seekers, despite the fact that it has expressed a
reluctance to do so. However, even if China could be convinced, Chinese
nationality may not necessarily be a desirable solution for some. In addition
to China's poor human rights record, there is evidence that the stateless
asylum-seekers in particular would be treated poorly. Those asylum seekers
termed ECVIIs spoke of being forced to work in labor camps while in
China.' ° They fear this result so much that they are willing to go to court to
prevent being sent back to mainland China.'o' Another solution must be found.
Thus, the final possibility, and, I argue, the one that should be most
vigorously pursued, is to encourage the UNHCR to grant all of the stateless
asylum-seekers refugee status and facilitate their resettlement in a suitable
third country. They fit the definition of refugees both as individuals and as a
group, and thus, fall under the competence of the High Commissioner.
Granting them refugee status would allow them to resettle in a third country.
But resettlement will only occur if suitable third countries such as the United
States, Australia, Britain, France, and Sweden are willing to accept these
refugees. Acceptance will hinge on the domestic and international political
pressure faced by these States. Already, a coalition of human rights groups
has begun lobbying these countries to accept the stateless asylum-seekers. 02
This pressure must be supported by the UNHCR. After all, these individuals
number only about 550, a number so small that they could hardly pose a
burden to any society. In the words of one human rights activist, "a small
amount of political will... is all these few families ask so that they can at last
have a place which they can call home." 10
3
97. Greg Torode, Rijkind Fails to Gain Pledge on Boat People, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 14,
1997.
98. Id.
99. Buerk, supra note 4.
100. Young, supra note 26.
101. Western, supra note 43.
102. This coalition includes Refugee Concern, Human Rights Watch Asia, and the International
Social Services. Neil Western, Stateless Claim Denial Puts Illegals in Abode Quandary, WORLD SouRCES
ONLINE INC., Sept. 16, 1997.
103. Id.
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